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Pragmatism should Not be a Substitute for Statistical 
Literacy, a Commentary on Albers, Kiers, and Van 
Ravenzwaaij (2018)
Ladislas Nalborczyk*,†, Paul-Christian Bürkner‡ and Donald R. Williams§
Based on the observation that frequentist confidence intervals and Bayesian credible intervals sometimes 
happen to have the same numerical boundaries (under very specific conditions), Albers et al. (2018) 
proposed to adopt the heuristic according to which they can usually be treated as equivalent. We argue 
that this heuristic can be misleading by showing that it does not generalise well to more complex (realistic) 
situations and models. Instead of pragmatism, we advocate for the use of parsimony in deciding which 
statistics to report. In a word, we recommend that a researcher interested in the Bayesian interpretation 
simply reports credible intervals.
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Context
The main line of reasoning of Albers et al. (2018) seems 
to be the following: as frequentist confidence intervals 
and Bayesian credible intervals sometimes happen to 
be similar, we can usually interpret them the same way. 
More precisely, they argue that because confidence 
intervals and credible intervals do sometimes have the 
same numerical boundaries (and because when they do, 
they have similar consequences on the inference being 
made), then, from a pragmatic perspective, they should be 
treated as equivalent.
While we agree with their main observation (i.e., that 
confidence intervals and credible intervals obtained with 
uninformative priors might sometimes coincide), we 
disagree with their main conclusion (i.e., that confidence 
intervals can be interpreted as credible intervals). We 
think the examples presented in Albers et al. (2018) are 
overly simplistic and actually quite rare. Moreover, the 
pragmatic stance tends to blur the distinction between 
credible intervals and confidence intervals, whereas we 
think it would be more efficient, at a pedagogical level, to 
emphasise these differences.
Rebuttals
Conditioning on impossible values
The debate between the frequentist and the Bayesian 
schools of inference has been firing for many decades and 
we do not wish to reiterate all the arguments here (we 
refer the interested reader to the introduction of Albers 
et al., 2018). Bayesian statistics rest on the use of Bayes’ 
rule, which states that:
( | ) ( | ) ( )p y p y pθ θ θ×∝
In other words, the posterior probability of some 
parameter (or vector of parameters) θ is proportional 
to the product of its prior probability p(θ) and the 
likelihood p(y|θ). Noteworthy here is that the posterior 
probability p(θ|y) can be interpreted as a conditional 
probability, given the data and the model (including the 
prior information).
This highlights a first undesirable consequence 
of Albers et al.’s (2018) proposal. Using confidence 
intervals (or credible intervals with flat priors) to make 
probability statements can lead to nonsensical situations. 
For instance, let’s say you’re fitting a simple linear 
regression model to estimate the average reaction time 
in some cognitive task.1 Using a confidence interval 
to make a probability statement (under the pretence 
that it is numerically similar to a credible interval) is 
akin to implicitly assuming a uniform prior over the 
reals. It means assuming that all values between –∞ 
and ∞ are equally plausible, including negative values. 
This is an inappropriate assumption when dealing with 
reaction times, proportions, scales scores, most physical 
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measurements (e.g., weight, height), or anything else that 
has a restricted range of definition.
Further, there are examples where numerically 
equivalent intervals do not necessarily reflect the 
most probable parameter values (given all available 
information), but could still have valid frequentist 
properties. Indeed, whereas both Bayesian and frequentist 
intervals could have nominal coverage probabilities 
(Albers et al., 2018), the additional requirement for 
(meaningful) probabilistic inference is compatibility with 
previous information. Rather, in addition to the data, the 
probabilities are also conditional on all assumptions 
including the prior distribution. To make this point, we 
use a recent example from a registered replication report 
(Verschuere et al., 2018). The original effect was reported 
as d = 1.45, 95% [0.29, 2.61] (Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008). 
Following the argument of Albers et al. (2018), we could 
state there is a 50% chance the effect is greater than 
1.45. Although this would be mathematically correct 
for the posterior distribution (Gelman 2013), this does 
not mean it accurately reflects the most probable values. 
Indeed, based on the priming literature, it would be 
unreasonable to make such a probability statement. On 
the other hand, we could envision such a wide interval 
(Bayesian or frequentist) covering the population value 
95% of the time. Thus, interpretive exchangeability is 
not a given and can lead to misleading inferences when 
conditioning on impossible values. We now move to a 
discussion of two concrete examples examining the 
generalisability of the heuristic suggested by Albers 
et al. (2018) in regards to the coverage properties (and 
the numerical boundaries) of confidence intervals and 
credible intervals.
Frequentist properties of Bayesian credible intervals
A simple regression example
In Figure 1, we present some simulation results showing 
that Bayesian credible intervals (obtained with weakly 
informative priors) do have the same properties as 
frequentist confidence intervals in the case of a simple 
regression model. Indeed, on repeated sampling, X% of 
the constructed intervals will contain the population value 
of θ (as expressed by the coverage proportion displayed in 
Figure 1).
Bayesian credible intervals with non-informative or 
weakly informative priors may have the same frequentist 
characteristics as confidence intervals, but also allow 
for conditional probability statements (e.g., given the 
prior and the information contained in the data, we can 
say that there is a X% probability that the population 
value of θ lies in the interval).2 Therefore, in simple 
situations, the principle of parsimony would lead to use 
and report the most inclusive (general) statistics. Thus, 
we suggest that the researcher interested in the Bayesian 
Figure 1: Coverage properties of Bayesian credible intervals when using weakly informative priors. Blue vertical cred-
ible intervals represent intervals that “missed” the population value of the parameter (whose value is represented by 
the horizontal dashed line), while grey intervals represent intervals that contained the population value. Note: for 
readability, only the first 100 simulations are plotted.
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interpretation should use and report Bayesian credible 
intervals.
What about more complex models?
In this section, we report simulation results of the coverage 
properties of both confidence and credible intervals 
around the amount of heterogeneity τ in random-effects 
meta-analysis models.
The effect sizes to be combined in meta-analyses are 
often found to be more variable than it would happen 
because of sampling alone. The usual way to take into 
account this heterogeneity is to use random-effects models 
(also known as multilevel models). Several methods have 
been proposed to obtain confidence intervals around the 
point estimate of τ in such models (for a discussion, see 
Williams, Rast, & Bürkner, 2018). The method developed 
by Paule and Mandel (1982) and implemented in the 
metafor package (Viechtbauer 2010) guarantees 
nominal coverage probabilities of confidence intervals 
computed with this method, even in small samples, given 
that model assumptions are satisfied. Below we compare 
the coverage properties of confidence intervals (computed 
with this method) and credible intervals for a simple 
random-effects meta-analysis model of 6 studies, with a 
population value of τ = 0.1 (see code in supplementary 
materials for more details).
As shown in Figure 2, the coverage proportion of 
confidence intervals is close to the nominal 95% value. 
However, the credible intervals (wider than the confidence 
intervals) appear to contain the population value of τ in 
almost all 10.000 simulations, resulting in a coverage 
proportion close to 1.
Thus, even when using non-informative priors (we used 
τ ∼ HalfCauchy(1000)), the numerical boundaries as well 
as the coverage properties of confidence intervals and 
credible intervals can differ considerably. More generally, 
we feel that using simplistic examples to make general 
claims is highly problematic in that there is no guarantee 
that this generalises well to more complex models.
Differences matter
Albers et al. (2018) write: “In the present paper, we 
have demonstrated by means of various examples that 
confidence intervals and credible intervals, in various 
practical situations, are very similar and will lead to the 
same conclusions for many practical purposes when 
relatively uninformative priors are used”.
Contrary to what the authors postulate, differences 
between confidence intervals and credible intervals are 
observable in a large variety of situations (actually, all 
but one). For instance (but non exhaustively), i) when 
samples are small, ii) when the space of the outcome is 
multi-modal or non-continuous, iii) when the range of 
the outcome is restricted, or iv) when the prior is at least 
weakly informative. Combining these four possibilities, 
we argue that confidence intervals and credible intervals 
actually almost never give similar results. Moreover, as 
we previously demonstrated, numerical estimates can be 
Figure 2: Coverage properties of 95% confidence intervals and 95% credible intervals for recovering the amount of 
heterogeneity in random-effects meta-analysis models. Note: For readability, only the first 100 simulations are plotted.
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similar, but it does not entail that the conclusion we can 
draw from it (i.e., the inference being made) should be 
similar.
In the previous sections, we discussed why we think 
the heuristic suggested by Albers et al. (2018) can be 
misleading. In the following, we suggest an alternative 
to pragmatism which does not preclude statistical 
literacy.
An alternative to pragmatism
Applying parsimony in scientific and statistical 
practise
Albers et al. (2018) write: “By recognizing the near-
equivalence between Bayesian and frequentist estimation 
intervals in ‘regular cases’, one can benefit from both 
worlds by incorporating both types of analysis in their 
study, which will lead to additional insights.”
Confidence intervals can sometimes (i.e., under 
specific conditions) be identified with a special case of 
credible intervals for which priors are non-informative. 
Thus, one could ask, in consideration of the parsimony 
principle, why reporting redundant statistics? Would 
not it be easier to use the more general and flexible 
case? The parsimonious stance that we adopt here leads 
to the conclusion that the researcher interested in one 
specific interpretation should report the statistics that 
corresponds to this goal.3 If a researcher is interested in 
the sampling distribution of the statistics under study (or 
in reaching a nominal coverage proportion), she should 
report confidence intervals. If she is rather interested in 
making conditional probability statements from the data, 
then s⋅he should report credible intervals (or ideally, the 
full posterior distribution).
A brief note on the frequentist properties of Bayesian 
procedures
Albers et al. (2018) quote Bayarri and Berger (2004) that 
wrote: “Statisticians should readily use both Bayesian and 
frequentist ideas”.
We could not agree more with this statement. In 
addition, we recognise that both statistical traditions 
have their own advantages and drawbacks, and have been 
built to answer somehow different questions. Therefore, 
pretending that a statistic issued from one school of 
inference can be interpreted as a statistic issued from 
another school because they sometimes (under very 
restricted conditions) give the same numerical estimates 
is confusing and misleading.
Conclusions and practical recommendations
To sum up, we feel that every proposal going in the 
direction of more fuzziness in the distinction between 
different kinds of intervals is misleading and should be 
rejected. Using a confidence interval as a credible interval 
or using a credible interval as a confidence interval seems 
inappropriate to us, as it tends to blur the distinction 
between essentially different statistical tools. Instead, we 
prefer to emphatically teach and discuss the differences 
between these tools and their domains of application. As 
Hoekstra, Morey, and Wagenmakers (2018), we believe that 
“the more pragmatic approach in which philosophically 
unsound interpretations of CIs are permitted and even 
endorsed is unhelpful, and should be replaced by a 
more principled one. If students are to learn a certain 
statistical technique, expecting from statistics teachers to 
guard them against quick-and-dirty versions seems very 
reasonable indeed”.
Given the limitations of the pragmatic perspective 
offered by Albers et al. (2018) and the potentially harmful 
consequences of the heuristic they argued for, we 
rather suggest to use parsimony as a guiding principle 
in deciding which statistics to use and to report. In 
brief, we recommend that a researcher interested in the 
Bayesian interpretation of an interval simply reports 
credible intervals (or that a researcher interested in the 
coverage properties of confidence intervals simply reports 
confidence intervals).
Data Accessibility Statement
Reproducible code and figures are available at: https://
osf.io/nmp6x/.
Notes
 1 Which is given by the intercept of the model, if no 
predictor is included, or if these predictors have been 
contrast-coded.
 2 Although, as we discussed earlier, this probability 
statement, while valid, makes little sense knowing that 
it is conditional on all possible values being equally 
likely a priori.
 3 Obviously, it is perfectly legitimate to be interested in 
several goals, but these goals should be clearly stated 
as such, and pursued using appropriate tools.
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